Tricked into Handing Over a Bank Account? Article 22 of Taiwan’s Money Laundering Control Act Explained
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目錄
- 1. What Does Article 22 of the Money Laundering Control Act Regulate?
- 2. The Core of the Court’s Ruling: The Issue Is Not Limited to a Relationship of Trust Between Family or Friends
- 3. What Does It Mean to Be “Deceived and Therefore Lack Criminal Intent”?
- 4. Knowing Someone for Only Three Days Does Not Automatically Negate Trust—or Automatically Exempt You from Liability
- 5. How Can a Defendant Build a Defense Based on Being Deceived into Handing Over an Account?
- 6. Being Deceived into Handing Over an Account Does Not Eliminate Other Potential Criminal Liability
- 7. What Should You Do If You Have Already Received a Police Notice, Summons, or Indictment?
- 8. Conclusion: The Key Question Is What You Knew When You Handed Over the Account
In recent years, fraud rings have not only used bank accounts to receive criminal proceeds, but have also deceived individuals into handing over bankbooks, ATM cards, online banking credentials, mobile phones, or verification information under the guise of loans, employment opportunities, investments, online friendships, romantic relationships, or other seemingly legitimate arrangements.
Many people do not realize that they may have become defendants in a criminal case until their accounts are designated as warning accounts, they receive a notice from the police, or they are summoned by prosecutors.
In these cases, prosecutors may argue that because the defendant handed the account to an online acquaintance they had known only briefly, the situation does not objectively fall within the statutory exception under Article 22 of the Money Laundering Control Act for a relationship of trust between family members or friends, and that the defendant should therefore bear legal responsibility.
However, Taichung Branch Court of the Taiwan High Court Criminal Judgment No. 27 of 2026 (Jin-Shang-Yi-Zi No. 27) emphasizes that the inquiry should not end with whether the defendant objectively qualifies for the family-or-friends trust exception.
A more fundamental question is whether, at the time the defendant handed over the account, the defendant had been deceived and therefore lacked direct or indirect intent to provide the account for another person’s unlawful use.
Special Note: The Taichung Branch Court of the Taiwan High Court Criminal Judgment No. 27 of 2026 discussed in this article is a publicly available court decision. Chien Sheng International Law Firm did not represent, handle, or otherwise participate in this case.
This article provides only a general analysis of the legal principles reflected in the judgment and does not constitute commentary by Chien Sheng International Law Firm on the parties or the specific outcome of the case.
This legal reasoning is particularly relevant to individuals who were deceived into providing their accounts through fake loan, employment, investment, romance, or other scams.
However, the ruling does not mean that merely saying “I was deceived” automatically eliminates criminal liability.
The key is whether objective evidence can establish that the defendant’s decision to hand over the account was actually manipulated by deception, that the defendant did not know the account would be used unlawfully, and that the defendant did not foresee such unlawful use and nevertheless accept or tolerate that risk.
1. What Does Article 22 of the Money Laundering Control Act Regulate?
Under Article 22, Paragraph 1 of Taiwan’s Money Laundering Control Act, a person generally may not hand over or provide for another person’s use an account opened by themselves or another person with a financial institution, or an account registered with a virtual asset service provider, third-party payment service provider, or other covered business or person.
Exceptions may apply where the conduct is consistent with ordinary commercial or financial practices, is based on a relationship of trust between family members or friends, or is supported by another legitimate reason.
The purpose of this provision is to prevent bank accounts, virtual asset accounts, and third-party payment accounts from being used as mule accounts through which fraud rings receive, transfer, or conceal criminal proceeds.
The law therefore places responsibility on account holders to safeguard their accounts and avoid casually transferring effective control of those accounts to others.
People often treat “providing an account number” and “handing over an account” as though they were the same thing.
They are not necessarily equivalent.
Simply providing an account number so another person can transfer salary, payment for goods, repayment of a loan, or another legitimate payment owed to the account holder is different from handing over an ATM card, password, online banking credentials, mobile phone, or verification code that allows another person to exercise actual control over the account.
Each case therefore requires an examination of what information or devices were provided, what authority the other person actually obtained, and how the account was subsequently used.
Under the current statutory framework, a violation of Article 22, Paragraph 1 may, in applicable circumstances, first result in an administrative warning issued by the police.
Criminal liability may arise under specified circumstances, including certain cases involving compensation or benefits, the provision of multiple accounts, or repeated violations within the statutory period following a prior warning.
Moreover, if the account holder does more than merely hand over the account—for example, if the person later withdraws, transfers, or delivers funds according to another person’s instructions—the case may also involve allegations of aiding fraud, money laundering, or even principal liability for fraud or money laundering, depending on the evidence.
Accordingly, the fact that an account was initially obtained through deception does not eliminate the need to examine what the account holder did afterward.
2. The Core of the Court’s Ruling: The Issue Is Not Limited to a Relationship of Trust Between Family or Friends
In Taichung Branch Court of the Taiwan High Court Criminal Judgment No. 27 of 2026, prosecutors emphasized that the defendant had known a person using the online name “Chen Zhen-Dong” for only three days.
The prosecution argued that such a short relationship could not constitute the “relationship of trust between family members or friends” contemplated by Article 22 of the Money Laundering Control Act, and that emotional trust should not override a citizen’s obligation to comply with the law.
The court, however, explained that the legislative history of former Article 15-2 of the Money Laundering Control Act, which corresponds to current Article 22, expressly recognizes that where a person has been deceived and therefore lacks awareness of the elements of the prohibited conduct, the person lacks the necessary subjective intent and should not be punished under the provision.
Accordingly, the central issue was not merely whether the defendant objectively satisfied the statutory exception for a relationship of trust between family members or friends.
Rather, the key question was whether the defendant, when handing over the account, had been deceived and therefore lacked direct or indirect intent to provide the account for another person’s unlawful use.
1.This reasoning can be understood at two levels.
First, a relationship of trust between family members or friends is one of the legitimate grounds expressly recognized by law, but it is not the only consideration relevant to every case.
Even where the recipient of the account is not a family member or friend in the conventional sense, that fact alone does not establish that the person providing the account necessarily possessed criminal intent.
2. Second, the court must still examine the account holder’s subjective understanding at the time of the transfer.
If the person was deceived about the other party’s identity, employment opportunity, loan arrangement, investment, romantic relationship, or other circumstances and therefore did not know that the account would be used as a tool for unlawful receipt or transfer of funds, the person may lack the subjective intent required for liability under Article 22.
In other words, “knowing someone for only three days” may be relevant evidence when evaluating trust and foreseeability of risk, but it cannot replace the required inquiry into criminal intent.
Knowing someone for only a short time does not automatically establish guilt.
Likewise, knowing someone for a long time does not automatically establish innocence.
3. What Does It Mean to Be “Deceived and Therefore Lack Criminal Intent”?
In this context, being deceived means more than realizing afterward that one has been scammed.
It is also not enough simply to state, “I never intended to commit a crime.”
Courts will generally examine whether the deception actually affected the person’s decision-making and what the person knew, believed, and foresaw at the time the account was handed over.
For example, a fraudster may impersonate a bank employee, loan company, employer, investment adviser, overseas contact, or romantic partner and provide a seemingly legitimate reason for requesting a bankbook, ATM card, or online banking information.
The victim may believe that the information is required to process a loan, verify salary payments, receive compensation, confirm identity, or assist with an apparently legitimate transaction, without knowing that the account will actually be used by a fraud ring.
If objective evidence supports such circumstances, a genuine issue may arise as to whether the defendant physically handed over the account but did so because the decision itself was manipulated by deception.
That is legally different from a situation in which a person knows the account may be used unlawfully but nevertheless provides it because they expect compensation or simply do not care whether others suffer losses.
On the other hand, if the person understands that the other party is requesting effective control over the account, recognizes the possibility that the account may be used to receive unlawful funds, and nevertheless chooses to hand it over, prosecutors may argue that the person had at least indirect intent.
In simple terms, indirect intent may arise where a person foresees that an unlawful result could occur and nevertheless accepts or tolerates that result.
For this reason, saying “I was deceived” does not resolve the case by itself.
The investigation should address concrete questions such as:
1.What identity or explanation did the other person use when approaching the defendant?
2.How did the other person persuade the defendant to provide the account or account-control information?
3.Did the defendant provide only the account number, or also an ATM card, password, online banking access, mobile phone, or verification code?
4.Did the defendant know that the other person would actually operate or control the account?
5.Did the defendant receive compensation, commission, or any other benefit?
6.Did the defendant notice suspicious circumstances but continue cooperating?
7.What did the defendant do after discovering that the account had been used abnormally?
4. Knowing Someone for Only Three Days Does Not Automatically Negate Trust—or Automatically Exempt You from Liability
The court’s ruling does not mean that a person may freely hand over a bank account merely because they claim to have trusted or developed feelings for the recipient.
Rather, the ruling emphasizes that a court should not skip the substantive inquiry into deception and criminal intent simply because the parties had known each other for only a short period.
As a matter of ordinary experience, a short acquaintance, an unclear identity, and a request for an ATM card and password may reasonably be viewed as significant warning signs.
Such circumstances may affect the court’s assessment of whether the defendant could foresee that the account might be used unlawfully and may support a prosecutor’s argument concerning indirect intent.
However, the level of risk and the existence of criminal intent are not identical questions.
The court must still examine whether the fraudster used specific deceptive techniques, whether the defendant was actually misled, and whether the defendant genuinely understood that the account would be used unlawfully by another person.
Conversely, even a long-standing relationship or claimed family-or-friend relationship does not automatically provide immunity.
If the account holder knows that the other person wants the account to receive unexplained funds or to avoid detection and nevertheless agrees to provide it, criminal intent may still be established depending on the evidence.
A “relationship of trust between family members or friends” is therefore not a blanket defense.
Likewise, “knowing someone for only a short time” is not itself proof of guilt.
The analysis must return to the defendant’s actual knowledge and decision-making process at the time the account was handed over.
5. How Can a Defendant Build a Defense Based on Being Deceived into Handing Over an Account?
1. Reconstruct the Initial Contact and Preserve the Complete Conversation
Preserve complete chat histories, voice messages, call logs, emails, social media account information, company or employment information provided by the other person, and any other materials showing the representations used in the alleged scam.
Do not preserve only a few screenshots that appear favorable.
Complete records are more useful in showing how the other person built trust, what requests were made, how the purported purpose of the account was explained, and when the defendant first became suspicious.
2. Explain Why the Defendant Believed the Other Person
A defense should explain why the defendant believed the representations made at the time rather than simply asserting that the defendant “had no criminal intent.”
For example, did the other person provide apparently legitimate employment information, loan procedures, an investment platform, corporate documents, identity information, or other materials that could reasonably influence the defendant’s decision?
These circumstances will not necessarily be accepted by the court, but objective evidence should be used to reconstruct the defendant’s decision-making context.
The relevant question concerns the defendant’s subjective state when the account was provided, rather than assuming from the eventual criminal use of the account that the defendant must have known about the scheme from the beginning.
3. Distinguish Between Providing an Account Number and Transferring Control of the Account
The defendant should clearly identify exactly what was provided.
Providing only an account number may present different legal issues from handing over an ATM card, password, online banking credentials, mobile phone, digital certificate, SMS verification code, or another device or credential that permits control of the account.
Even if the defendant did transfer effective control of the account, that fact does not automatically establish guilt.
However, the defendant will need to explain more specifically why the information or devices were provided, how the other person obtained them, and whether the defendant understood that the other person could actually operate the account.
4. Explain What Happened After Suspicious Activity Was Discovered
The defendant’s conduct after discovering that the account had been flagged, receiving a bank notification, noticing unexplained deposits, or realizing that the other person’s explanations were inconsistent may also be relevant.
For example:
■ Did the defendant immediately contact the bank?
■ Was the account reported lost, suspended, or frozen?
■ Did the defendant contact the police?
■ Were chat records preserved?
■ Did the defendant attempt to contact the other person?
■ Did the defendant refuse to continue cooperating?
■ Or did the defendant continue withdrawing or transferring funds at the other person’s direction?
These facts do not independently determine guilt or innocence, but they may help establish when the defendant first became aware of suspicious activity and whether the defendant continued participating afterward.
5. Do Not Delete Messages or Fabricate an Explanation After the Fact
Cases involving accounts obtained through deception often depend heavily on digital evidence.
Deleting conversations, resetting a phone, discarding an ATM card, deleting social media accounts, or retaining only selectively edited screenshots may make the defense more difficult.
Original data should be preserved whenever possible, together with information concerning its source, date, and storage location.
If the defendant does not remember a detail, the defendant should not guess merely to make the story appear complete.
Material inconsistencies may later be used to argue that the defendant actually knew how the account would be used.
6. Being Deceived into Handing Over an Account Does Not Eliminate Other Potential Criminal Liability
The legal principle discussed in this judgment focuses on the subjective intent required under Article 22 of the Money Laundering Control Act.
However, if the same case also involves fraud victims transferring money into the account, suspicious fund flows, withdrawals, or subsequent transfers, prosecutors may separately investigate possible aiding fraud, aiding money laundering, or other criminal liability.
Accordingly, a defense cannot stop at arguing that there was no intent under Article 22.
It should also examine whether:
■ the defendant knew the account would receive money obtained from fraud victims;
■ the defendant withdrew or transferred funds at another person’s direction;
■ the defendant received compensation, commission, or a share of the proceeds;
■ the defendant recruited others or collected additional accounts;
■ the defendant continued cooperating after suspicious funds appeared; or
■ the defendant shared criminal intent or participated in a division of roles with other participants.
A person may initially hand over an account because they were deceived, but later learn that something is wrong and nevertheless actively withdraw or transfer funds.
Similarly, a person may initially provide only an account number but later accept payment and transfer effective control of the account.
The person’s conduct and state of mind at these different stages must be evaluated separately rather than treated as one undifferentiated event.
7. What Should You Do If You Have Already Received a Police Notice, Summons, or Indictment?
1. Identify the Current Procedural Stage
A police notice, police administrative warning, prosecutorial summons, indictment, and court hearing notice represent different stages of the legal process and require different responses.
2. Prepare a Complete Timeline
The timeline should include:
■ when the defendant first met or contacted the other person;
■ how the other person made the request;
■ when and what information or devices the defendant provided;
■ when abnormal account activity first appeared;
■ when the defendant realized they may have been deceived; and
■ what the defendant did afterward.
3. Preserve All Objective Evidence
Relevant evidence may include:
■ complete chat histories;
■ call logs;
■ transfer records;
■ shipping records for ATM cards or other items;
■ logistics records;
■ bank notifications;
■ mobile-device login records;
■ police reports;
■ communications with the bank; and
■ other relevant documents.
4. Consult a Criminal Defense Lawyer Before Questioning
Statements in a criminal investigation should be truthful.
Do not exaggerate, conceal facts, or coordinate a fabricated version of events with another person.
If you are uncertain about a detail or genuinely do not remember it, say so clearly rather than filling gaps in your memory with speculation.
5. Make Sure the Defense Addresses All Relevant Legal Risks
The defense strategy should consider not only Article 22 of the Money Laundering Control Act but also possible allegations involving aiding fraud, aiding money laundering, civil compensation claims, and account restrictions.
Addressing only one offense may leave other significant legal risks unanswered.
8. Conclusion: The Key Question Is What You Knew When You Handed Over the Account
The central principle reflected in Taichung Branch Court of the Taiwan High Court Criminal Judgment No. 27 of 2026 can be summarized in one sentence:
A case involving the transfer of an account cannot be decided solely by asking whether the parties were family or friends, or how many days they had known each other. The court must determine whether the person was deceived in a way that affected the decision to hand over the account and therefore lacked the subjective intent to provide the account for another person’s unlawful use.
For individuals deceived through fake loans, fake employment opportunities, fake investments, or romance scams, this reasoning may provide an important defense issue.
However, being deceived must be demonstrated through the complete factual circumstances and objective evidence.
A simple denial of criminal intent cannot substitute for an examination of the evidence.
If you or a family member has been investigated, issued an administrative warning, or prosecuted after being deceived into handing over an account—and particularly if the case also involves allegations of aiding fraud or money laundering—it is important to preserve chat records, account information, and a complete timeline as early as possible.
A criminal defense lawyer familiar with account-related fraud and money laundering cases can examine the defendant’s knowledge at the time the account was provided, the nature of the deception, the extent of account control transferred to the other person, and the subsequent flow of funds.
Chien Sheng International Law Firm can review the available evidence, identify the principal disputed issues, and develop an appropriate criminal defense strategy based on the circumstances of the individual case.※ This article provides general legal information and does not replace legal advice regarding any specific case. Taiwan’s Money Laundering Control Act and relevant judicial interpretations may change over time. Actual cases should be evaluated according to the law and judicial decisions applicable at the relevant time, together with the specific evidence in the case.
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